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It is very encouraging that the authors of this special issue are giving renewed 
attention to the contribution of social norms to the creation and maintenance of 
culture. Such a focus has long been called for (Pepitone, 1976), but rarely achieved up 
to the present. Focusing on norms is one way of recontextualizing social psychology, 
and another is to make sure in our studies that we  sample a full range of social 
contexts. To date, the great majority of studies of subjective norms have been 
conducted within single cultural settings, typically within North America or East 
Asia, and often with student respondents. There is an implicit assumption that 
subjective norms are either equally important everywhere (Wan, this issue; Gao et al, 
this issue; Shteynberg, this issue), or else that they are essentially similar but differ in 
strength across cultures (e.g.,  Shteynberg et al., 2009; Tam et al., 2012). These 
studies are an advance on the earlier basic finding that conformity levels vary with 
culture (Bond & Smith, 1996), because they do measure the postulated causal 
mechanism directly. However, they leave open conceptual issues as to how best to 
understand variations in which types of norm might be relevant to a given cultural 
setting. 
For instance, a distinction is often made between descriptive or subjective 
norms on the one hand and prescriptive or injunctive norms on the other hand. This 
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parallels the contrast between informational and normative influence employed by 
early conformity researchers. Subjective norms can provide guidelines in ambiguous 
or ill-defined settings such as laboratory experiments and in cultures guided by 
autonomy values. Prescriptive norms will be more salient in settings that are longer 
lasting and guided by collectivistic values and in settings where real or imagined 
penalties are in place for those who transgress. As Morris and Liu (this issue) suggest, 
subjective norms may evolve into prescriptive norms over time, but it seems likely 
that this would occur more rapidly in some cultural contexts than others. In settings 
where analytic modes of thinking are favored, the distinction between these two types 
of norm is easy enough to make. In the collectivistic settings where more holistic 
modes of thinking are favored, I would speculate that the distinction would be more 
rapidly blurred or lost. Thus it is possible that the greater salience of subjective norms 
found in Asian samples for instance by Tam et al.  could arise because any perceived 
subjective norm has a more prescriptive overtone than would be the case among 
North American samples. 
Gelfand and Harrington (this issue) explore predominantly individual-level 
motives likely to enhance reliance on subjective norms. Their perspective has equal 
potential when applied more directly to dimensions of culture-level variability. For 
instance, motives to manage uncertainty and threat are likely to be particularly 
prevalent in cultures high on uncertainty avoidance as defined by Hofstede (2001). In 
a similar way, motives to manage impressions would be especially salient in cultures 
that are collectivistic and tight rather than loose, and motives relating to power would 
be particularly relevant in cultures high on power distance. Each of these contexts are 
ones in which repeated attention to norms of the type discussed by Shteynberg (this 
issue)  is especially likely. Tests of these speculations would required targeted 
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sampling of settings known to be high and low on these dimensions of culture. There 
is a strong case for making such tests at the level of contrasting cultures because 
doing so is likely to encompass greater degrees of variance in normativeness than is 
typical within a single setting. 
We have as yet few studies of subjective norms that sample cultures widely, 
and little agreement as to what types of descriptive norms would be the right ones to 
sample. Most such studies have focused on subjective norms for value dimensions 
(House et al., 2004) and these find low levels of consensus as to what is normative at 
the national level (Fischer et al., 2009). Of course, there are relatively few occasions 
on which one might wish to think of oneself in terms of nation-level norms.  National 
cultures are more likely to differ from one another in the salience of the subjective 
norms of more proximal groups and subcultures. We may also do better to focus less 
on norms concerning abstract variables such as values, whose behavioral implications 
can be interpreted variously, and more on norms about specific behaviors. For 
instance,  Matsumoto et al. (2008) have identified substantial variation in norms about 
expression of specific emotions in differing contexts across 32 nations. This study 
showed that individualism-collectivism could explain substantial differences in the 
ways that subjective norms prescribed behavior toward in-groups and toward out-
groups. This provides a key illustration of the relevance of social context in our 
conceptualization of subjective norms. Which are the contexts from which we 
consider it relevant to derive information as to what is normative? It would be 
valuable to link the collective representation perspective of Wan (this issue) with the 
types of data assembled by Matsumoto et al. (2008). 
I would argue that to achieve a full understanding of the role of norms we 
need to seek out settings where they are especially salient, and where deviance is 
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sanctioned. We have some understanding of their differing content and importance in 
face, honor and dignity cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011), and in relation to intergroup 
conflicts (DeRidder & Tripathi, 1992). Focus on the face cultures of East Asia 
encourages us to think predominantly of conformity, but as Morris and Liu (this issue) 
discuss, there are contexts where the balance of priorities can favor deviance rather 
than conformity. For instance, in high power distance cultures there is potential for 
the presence also of perverse norms. These are injunctive norms that are frequently 
violated (traffic speed limits provide an everyday example), but which high power 
persons can capriciously enforce or threaten to enforce, in ways that sustain their 
personal power (Fernandez-Dols, 2002). 
Study of subjective norms certainly holds much promise for gaining a fuller 
understanding of the genesis and maintenance of culture and cultural differences. To 
derive full benefit from this initiative, it will be important to follow the lead of those 
(e.g., Zou, Tam, Morris, et al., 2009) who have made a promising start on broadening 
sampling frames and testing the predictive validity of norms competitively against 
existing conceptualizations such as those based upon values and beliefs. 
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